- 1.结构分析法（演绎法、两点一面）；
My understanding is that investment analysis is a technology for how to respond to change, and it is never a technology for how to predict the future. Whether as a fundamental or as a technical tool, the basis of investment analysis is to build on the evolution of events themselves and to map future changes through the probability of analytical events. In this system, technical analysis clearly occupies an extremely important place. In general, technical analysis is the study of market price changes or fluctuations. It is well known that prices do not always reflect value, or are not a frequent phenomenon, and there is always a gap or even too much distance between the two.
In capital markets, the vast majority of trades are aimed at achieving underbought bullishness (except for interest-targeted money funds or index funds that aim for average returns). Even value traders carefully measure the relationship between price and price bubbles, which is also the key to successful trading. Marx, president of Oakwood Capital Management, says that bubbles are not inherently high-yielding in any asset class and are only attractive if the price is right.
虽则如此，自上世纪早期查尔斯.道开辟技术分析这个领域，百多年来技术分析的体系日臻成熟，但其效用至今仍是见仁见智。原因很简单，技术分析毕竟是一个工具，其成效取决于使用者的自身素养、经验以及熟练的程度。此外，技术分析理论亦有其自身不可克服的缺陷，总有相当多的价格现象超出技术分析的能力之外。换句话说，技术分析确有其能力边界，其边界在于交易者的交易行为以不能扰动市场为限。如其交易行为大到足以扰动市场的程度，使交易标的丧失部分或全部流动性，那么其交易行为自身将成为价格走势的一部分，它的交易行为将成为其他交易者的研究对象并据此做出反应。这样以来，技术分析将趋于无效。即便完全尊重技术分析的能力边界，交易者通过技术分析所得出的结论也并不总是可靠的、完全的，甚至是片面的、荒谬的。
Mr. Soros has a wonderful explanation for this. He says: "I suppose, with a few exceptions, that our mental conceptions are, or may be, flawed, that our understanding of the world around us is inherently incomplete, and that the conditions we are born to understand in order to make decisions are in fact influenced by those decisions".
He meant: that the analysis of the object of study as an observer is more dependent on the individual observer himself, and that the cognitive capacity of the individual observer is differentiated, incomplete, and flawed; and, second, that the facts on which the observer depends are always prone to variation, imbalance, and that the causes are not linear but always non-linear. Thus, the decision-makers involved in the transaction process do not make decisions entirely on the basis of facts, but on the basis of the interpretation of the facts, which is always confused with the individual's perception and style, and is distant from the facts.
The hardest thing to judge in trading is what price level is safe, and unfortunately, due to the flaws of the theory and the limitations of the trader himself, the probability of making a mistake is extremely high even if it is confirmed by the theory. If I had to sum up my practical skills, I would use one word: escape. Running a hedge fund makes the most of my escape training. I am rich simply because I know when I'm wrong.
Therefore, traders must accept the notion of controlling losses and always give a benchmark for whether or not they made a mistake. This is a requirement of technical analysis's own logic, which is a negative thinking system in nature. Excellent traders will always give a benchmark to prove themselves wrong after having a position. The trade is only valid and reliable until they have proven themselves wrong.
As Karl Popper said, the fallacy cannot be falsified, it is not a science, it can only be a pseudoscience, but many theories refuse to admit their own flaws, such as the traders' familiar value trades. If the value trader determines that an investment has a sufficient margin of safety, then when the price falls, the margin of safety will become larger, and the trader will not recognize that the previous decision was wrong.
The trading team at LTCM, known as the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) Group, produced impressive annual returns of 28.5%, 42.8%, 40.8% and 17%, respectively, and was organized by partners including Nobel Prize-winning economists, options pricing model inventors Merton and Scholes, as well as former Treasury secretaries, former Fed vice chairman Morris, former Solomon Brothers head of bond trading, and Rothschild. Between 1994 and 1997, LTCM produced impressive returns of 28.5%, 42.8%, 40.8%, and 17%, respectively. More importantly, their trades appeared to be lossless, and prominent economists, such as Shapiro Shapiro, were unfazed in asking Scholes: "Where do you think the unusual events will happen?"
Black swans that were not originally part of the model study, such as the Russian financial crisis, really happened suddenly: on August 17, 1998, Russia announced the devaluation of the ruble, stopped trading in government bonds, and froze the repayment period of foreign investors for 90 days. This caused an extreme panic in international financial markets, with investors panicking to sell emerging market bonds, low-risk holdings, and secured U.S. and German government bonds. The relevant hedging trades on which it relied were reversed, and the trading model failed.
There are many factors that lead to the failure of long-term capital companies, but the most deadly is the existence of insurmountable flaws in the theoretical foundations on which it depends, such as the rise of the system of parity pricing, which results in a method of buying twice as much in the direction of the loss if the loss. As one veteran said: "The LTCM bet on red wins, every time the wheel stops on black, he doubles the stake, in such a game of chance, only the bettor of $ 1,000 may lose, and the bettor of a billion dollars will inevitably win, because red will eventually appear, provided you have to have enough chips to keep playing until that moment".
Of course, in the case of the stock market, if all uncertainties are excluded, in a hypothetical rational condition, excluding potential challengers, technological mutations, or the management of the enterprise itself, and market risks, the downward doubling approach is not without merit, the danger is that all the assumptions excluded by the trader are inevitable. Time is a master of the art, it always tends to disrupt everything that exists. If we live in an ideal world, there is an infinite amount of money available, but also an infinite amount of markets that can afford these huge amounts of money, and maybe win all the time.
The failure of long-term capital firms gives traders profound inspiration on at least two points: first, the economic model always has a series of assumptions as a premise, and the model's assumptions about what to do if a problem arises. For example, the hypothesis that the price of a lever evolves in a trend-like fashion is one of the basic assumptions of technical analysis, in which the term "trend" should be used very well, but what is a trend?
In the system of investment analysis, technical analysis studies the patterns of price fluctuations and correlation problems; quantitative models study the correlation between prices through time sequences, and thereby develop various types of trading models; fundamental analysis seeks to find the deviation between price and intrinsic value; and there are various other models of advantage. However, there are a variety of other models of analysis. However, there are corresponding assumptions, most of which are in conflict with reality, and there are many assumptions that cannot be assumed at all, such as the P-5 model of wave theory.
In our long-term practice, we have found that there are three major problems with traditional systems of technical analysis, which differ in degree:
The first is a question of precision. The concept of a trend, which the trader understands as a movement, a tendency, gives rise to the problem of synonymous repetition. Therefore, the fundamental important concept of trend is not defined in the traditional technical analysis system and does not give an accurate description of the planned amount, which causes great confusion for real-world operations.
The second is the problem of universality. For example, wave theory, with its looping pattern of 5-5 bits, may be appropriate for analyzing stock indexes, but it is extremely difficult to analyze individual stocks. Pritchett has frankly admitted that wave theory is not suitable for individual stocks.
The third is the probability description problem. Traders can only use vague terms to describe the market, such as the probability of a bullish index going up or down, the probability of a bullish index going down, the probability of a bullish index going up, the probability of a bullish index going down, etc.
So the three big problems of technical analysis, the precision problem, the generality problem, and the probability description are not solvable?
Structural analysis, of course, is still a method of technical analysis in its basic form, but it is a completely new methodology, built entirely on the fluctuating laws of the market itself, and it is not a closed car, a product invented in a vacuum. Although it borrows distinct terminology from traditional technical analysis theory, it has no connection to the traditional system of technical analysis, and it is not a synthesis and integration of traditional theories such as Taoism, wave theory, fractional analysis.
For more than a century, researchers have focused too much on the technical analysis of predictive techniques in the system of technical analysis, which is a misconception. In fact, technical analysis is not a predictive science by its very nature, but a measurement technique that follows the fundamental structure of the market, which is the cornerstone of the whole system of analysis of the volatile structure of the price itself. The basic principle of structural analysis is to describe the patterns of price fluctuations that have occurred and to have an objective understanding of the nature of the market. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to say that structural analysis is first of all a philosophical way of thinking.
The method of structural analysis is purely a deductive one; it starts from the price of the financial market, and, through the construction of concepts, categories, laws, and theories, gives this method of analysis in the form of a system of logical structures, so that the determinants and hierarchies of the price structure are fully demonstrated, while at the same time excluding the unnecessary hypotheses of the hypothesis, making it both consistent with the principle of logical simplicity and with a concise and intuitive formulation. Of course, the logic of thought behind it, structural analysts inherited the negative logic of the traditional method of technical analysis.
As far as I know, the method of wave theory is to exclude laws, to exclude other possibilities, the last of which is market reality. This multiplicity of wave theory is sickening to many traders, but I personally believe that it is precisely this multiplicity that embodies the artistic character of wave theory, the beautiful embodiment of the logic of negative thinking. Therefore, negative thinking logic is not only an intrinsic requirement of technical analysis, but should permeate the entire trading process of the trader.
In the system of structural analysis, an extremely important idea is that structure is a way of thinking and not a way of thinking; this has three layers of meaning: 1) structural thinking is itself a negative way of thinking; 2) the conclusions drawn through structural analysis are not necessarily the truth of the market; 3) therefore, in practice, there is a need for protective measures to control the risk of misjudgments. Although structural analysis is a description of the behavior of market prices themselves and the inferences based on it, the description or paradigm (a set of inferences assumed as premises) is precisely the characteristic of art, in this sense, structural analysis is an artistic science rather than an art of thinking.
In financial markets, the only criterion for measuring the superiority of a methodology or trading model is practicality. For example, the Dow Jones theory, although it has made a great pioneering contribution to the system of technical analysis, is very poor in practicality. The same is true of fractional analysis, which has made a disruptive contribution to the interpretation of financial markets, but it is not a trading system and is not viable. Wave theory's attempts to quantify price behaviour and the fractional thinking of the 5- to 5-digit model are unparalleled, giving no exaggerated evaluation, but it is incredibly reliable as a trading system, and its versatility is staggering.
In the system of structural analysis, unpredictability and unpredictability are the core trading strategies. Because technical analysis is the study of how to respond to change, it is the measurement of change, and unpredictability and unpredictability are the intrinsic requirements of technical analysis. An excellent trader has no position and does not anticipate, he just waits for the trend to tell him where the market is going, he holds his breath and waits for the prey to ambush him, he pulls the trigger, as long as it is not a natural reaction to the moment when the market changes.
We say that what the trader is trading is in fact his trading system, and after gaining a certain amount of experience, most traders will review and modify their trading system based on their previous experience, removing or adding some conditions to make it more complete, as for what the thinking logic behind the trading system is, which is unintentionally ignored. Human nature likes certainty, but technical analysis is a negative analytical method that requires traders to use it with a skeptical attitude.
其实，很多交易者虽然运用技术分析的交易模式，但并没有接受技术分析的思维逻辑。具体的表现就是不接受控制损失的观点，而采取低位补仓、降低成本的做法——这个方法其实就是在拒绝承认自己的错误，这是一种“肯定”的思维逻辑，而有经验的成熟交易者通常会接受“止损”的观念。也就是在进行交易之后，随时会给出证明自己错误的基准。这个基准主要包括：基于时间的止损、基于空间的止损、基于盈利的止损等等。这些交易模式的关键思维逻辑就是形成了“否定”的方式：只有在没有证明自己错误以前，这项投资才是有效的。亏损总是要发生的，关键的问题不在于何时发生，而是在于：它发生了，你怎么办？“如果一个头寸与我的判断相悖，我就出局；如果它与我的判断一致，我就继续持有。风险控制是交易中最重要的东西。如果一个亏损头寸让你感到不舒服，解决办法很简单：卖出，因为你总有机会再进来。”我觉得吉姆.琼斯的这句话价值连城。
It seems that risk control and the crisis management of false speculation (which is also the problem of control of wind) are topics that traders must prioritize. Failure or mistakes are inevitable, and all traders can do is try to control the losses caused by failure, so that we do not fall into the rubble and can not get back up. As Bernard Baruch, a Wall Street celebrity, said: "If an investor can buy half of everything he buys, he should be satisfied, even if he buys only three or four times, if he stops quickly when he makes a mistake, he can still make a lot of money". William O'Neill, a top Wall Street investor, is of the same opinion, and after reviewing the past trading records, I found that every ten stocks he bought, only one of them was really big money.
However, many traders tend to understand risk control and crisis management as simply stopping losses, which jumps from one fault zone to another. Although stopping losses are important, the Shark's Law is about the importance of stopping losses, which means that if a shark bites your foot, the only chance of survival is to sacrifice that leg. Extending to financial markets, the Shark's Law is that if your trades deviate from the direction of the market, you should immediately close and not hide the good fortune. The reason for stopping losses lies in the randomness of the market, such as manipulation, crowd psychological cycles, etc.
In view of this, another trading strategy is being strengthened, that is, to increase the win rate or reduce the frequency of trades to ensure a stable level of returns. The strategy to increase the win rate to ensure a steady level of returns is ideally to increase the accuracy of the trading decision to reduce stop loss or stop loss. If we think about this strategy, we will find that there is a subtle paradox that after the trading system adds stop loss and stop loss instructions, the winning rate will tend to decrease, because stop loss and stop loss instructions are basically a means of correcting the wrong ones, so the way to increase the winning rate is necessarily to weaken the stop loss, so there is a very subtle cycle: as soon as the winning rate increases, the trader must tolerate losses.
In the system of structural analysis, we see that the problem of trading strategy is simplified to two-faceted, two-faceted, two-faceted, two-faceted, two-faceted, two-faceted. In such a trading strategy, wind control and crisis management are included in the buy and sell points, and are the preference issues of the buy and sell points, rather than wind control and crisis management problems.
When the buy signal comes up, it is the buy option; when the sell signal comes up, it is the sell option. In this way, the stop loss or buffer issue is naturally excluded from the trading system, and wind control and crisis management are naturally embedded in the two-point brake and thus naturally disappear.
In other words, in the system of structural analysis, the problem of control of wind is not a unit that can be measured independently, it is already organically contained in a two-pointed trading strategy and therefore disappears naturally. Those methods that foresee or reserve a stop-loss plan, or even treat this work as a necessary decision-making procedure or operational discipline, are extremely clumsy and harmful.
Even so, for traders who lack experience in structural analysis, and for those who lack experience in trading, stop losses are still central to trading strategy. If a trader has enough decisiveness, stop losses seem unnecessary, and he can completely exit quickly before the market shows any definite signs of reversal, the benefit of doing so is that he is not fooled by one round of false movements and leaves too early, or loses the trade fee due to frequent trading. But to the stop losses trader, once the price moves in an unfavorable direction, you know for sure that it is impossible to go there, or it is just a slight backlash, or it may drag the trader into the deep end.
Unfortunately, we have not yet found a perfect stop-loss rule: too far away, huge losses often affect the trader's decision; too close, it is quite possible that we will release a black horse of a staggering magnitude, while the price fluctuations in emerging markets are just as severe. We can only set up some stop-loss principles based on experience, just for reference by traders at the level of the cuckoo's nest, although it may seem insignificant, in some extreme situations it may become a lifesaver for traders:
The 5% rule: When a stock's loss expands to 5%, you should remind yourself to stop the loss at any time. Rule of Day 3: Stop loss at any time when a stock hits a significant support and shows no signs of pulling back on Day 3. Volume rule: Stop immediately when the price falls back and is accompanied by a large volume of trading (e.g. a swap rate of more than 20%). Profit rule: Once a trade is profitable, stop loss should be considered instead of waiting for the return to be completed.
I personally believe that a reasonable allocation of funds gives traders an advantage over a simple stop loss, which is a money management model that combines the Kelly formula with a price structure model that embodies the anti-equivalent price-fixing strategy.
The inverse equity strategy means reducing investment in the direction of loss and increasing investment in the direction of profit. This idea is fully reflected in the famous Penelope Kelly formula. Here is a simplified version of the Kelly formula:
2P-1 = X, where: P = probability of success, X = percentage of investment
The key point for the trader to use the Kelly formula is to judge the probability of profitability of the traded item and allocate funds according to the estimated probability. Rational allocation of funds is a necessary condition for obtaining a trading advantage. The essence of the Kelly formula is how to optimize the allocation of funds to give the trader a trading advantage under certain probabilities.
2 times 55% minus 1 is equal to 10%, X is equal to 1 million.
Money management is becoming increasingly important in modern risk investing, with the goal of controlling risk in practice by using optimal money management. Behind the counter-payoff strategy, the implicit consideration of uncertainty by the trader is a manifestation of negative logic. The corresponding behavior to the counter-payoff system is a stop loss. In the counter-payoff system, we can see that: losses incurred in the transaction are normal.
So, what is the strategy of the one-veil solution? Obviously, the problem of the one-veil solution mainly addresses the dynamic problem, that is, the unit-time yield problem. It is essentially a method of selecting stocks, in response to the looping pump, which helps to solve the problem of wind control, but the design of the one-veil solution is mainly aimed at the problem of stock dynamics.
We know that investment analysis is a technique of how to respond to change, and a basic principle of stock selection is to adapt to change, which is not only due to the change in the stock itself, such as the adoption of new technologies, asset restructuring, mainstream mutations, etc., but also to changes in the economic environment such as the economic cycle, industrial policies, etc. For example, the era of heavy industry, heavy machinery, colorful energy, petrochemicals, shipbuilding, etc., real estate in the context of consumer upgrades, the production of white wine and other fast-moving consumer goods are necessarily good trading varieties. After the end of this era, new technologies, new culture, new materials, etc. in the context of structural upgrades are good trading varieties.
In addition, the prospects of the listed company in the industry, the position of the listed company in the industry, whether the listed company has core competitive capabilities, especially the ability circle of the listed company's leadership team, are also important considerations, these things do not necessarily bring good trading opportunities, but can give a good safety margin to the trade. Of course, the soul and core of the stock selection strategy is the catalyst. Generally speaking, catalysts often come from several aspects, such as: major events affecting the production and operating conditions, major changes in industry supply or industry chain, the use of new technologies, acquisition restructuring phase, etc. These are all important contents of the forecast.
Although good strategies can establish a trader's advantage, successful trading sometimes depends on the excellent qualities of the trader. Often, the really puzzling question is who is playing the leading role in the process of trading. Traders engaged in economic activity are assumed by economists to be rational people who trade in the most reasonable, profitable way and never do things to their detriment.
After all, man is not a precise machine. It should be said that any analysis method is actually a psychological product of the psychological fluctuations of the market mood in both frenzy and depression, and the turmoil of the mood is constantly testing every trader. The prospect is not necessarily a winner, because only the opening of the position is likely to result in a loss; the prospect is not much more than a sustained profit, after all, the god of luck is not always in favor. Once a trade is opened, various favorable and unfavorable emotions surround the trader's mind.
It seems that most of the time, most people are driven by emotions, and emotions are the real protagonists of the trading market, while emotional control is the protagonist of the trading process. Clearly, financial markets are collective, and traders are in them, and following mainstream opinion is the natural reaction. This rabble-rousing Aries effect often gives people a sense of security in real life and work. For example, in the corporate work emphasizes the collective value of work, and the opinions of most people are often considered correct, so it is very easy for ordinary traders to bring this understanding into the trading behavior.
Another manifestation of emotional trading is excessive trading, which also devours the rational voice deep in our hearts. There is bright sunlight outside the window, there are twisting birds, but many traders would rather give up these pleasures and stay in the market's downfall, they seem to have to stay in the market, always looking for opportunities to trade without any consequences. Cheating others is bad enough, but they like to cheat themselves. People over-trade for various reasons, such as: a rush to make up for losses, fear of missing opportunities, misplaced strategies, the impact of on-the-spot factors, etc., but the most fundamental reason for over-trading must be the overestimation of the trader's own knowledge structure or the appearance of a successful trading system.
For example, in a bull market with a one-sided bull market, it is extremely easy to make money, and many people make a lot of money. The proverbial saying is that the first mistake is self-aggrandizement. They take it for granted that making money is their ability and not the market trend. They think that it is easy to trade stocks, and that money is something that comes easily. However, good luck does not knock twice on the same window. Once the market is turned, the business of making money quickly becomes a losing buy and sell, and then the second mistake follows: self-indulgence.
Studying the exceptionally successful traders found that their success was due to the unique will qualities of having the same cup of tea. A well-known experiment in psychology called the delayed gratification experiment: the experimenter gave a group of four-year-old children one sugar each and told them to eat only one if they ate it right away; if they waited 20 minutes to eat, they would eat two. Later follow-up observations found that children who ate two sugars with persistence showed stronger adaptability, self-confidence, and mental independence by middle school.
This is the story of two Buffett's golfing friends who decide to play a game of dice with him. They bet Buffett a hole-in-one score of zero in three days of golf. If he loses, he only has to pay $10 and if he wins, he will get $20,000. Everyone accepts the offer, but Mr. Buffett refuses. He says: "If you don't learn to limit yourself in small things, you won't be able to limit yourself in big things".
In contrast to Buffett's style, Rogers says: "Hey, I don't take my money at risk, I never will. The way successful investors do things is to do nothing, to wait until you see the money lying there, right in the corner of the wall, and all you have to do is walk past and pick it up. That's the way to invest. You have to wait patiently, and wait until you see, or find, or meet, or explore through research, something that you feel is stable, like a scout runner, and get it without taking too much risk.
Traders should realize that the object of our trading is the market, but the subject of our trading is ourselves, and that we have only expressed our knowledge and mental structure in a profit-and-loss manner through the trading system. In speculative trading, the ultimate success or failure may depend on your ability to delay the fulfillment of your expectations:
Do you want one sugar? or wait for two?
(Source: Translated online)